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DAN SMOOT

ONE-WAY CULTURAL EXCHANGES

Listing his successes in building bridges of friendship to Soviet-bloc nations, President Johnson, in his 1967 State of the Union message, said "We have entered into a cultural agreement with the Soviet Union for another two years."

Eisenhower negotiated the first Cultural Exchange Agreement with the Soviets in 1958. Each agreement is made for two years. The one Johnson mentioned was the fifth. It was negotiated in 1966, for a two-year period, 1967-1968.

Cultural Exchange Agreements are supposed to provide for reciprocal exchanges, between the United States and the Soviet Union, of scholars, students, and specialists in scientific, technical, educational, cultural, and other fields.

It took the Eisenhower administration almost a year to negotiate the first Cultural Exchange Agreement with the Soviets. The Soviets signed only after we had abandoned enough of our requests and granted enough of theirs to assure the Soviets of achieving their goals. The primary Soviet goals for the Cultural Exchange Program are: to earn hard currency by sending their concert artists and other performing groups on tours of the United States; to gather scientific and technical information; to propagandize the American public and institutions; to obtain credits; to recruit Americans as Soviet agents; to control the exchange delegations in such a way that both the Americans who go to the Soviet Union and the Russians who come here serve the Kremlin.

American students and scholars in the Soviet Union are so severely restricted in their access to libraries and archives that they learn nothing of value. The Soviets argue that the Exchange Agreements do not require them to give access to state records, and, of course, all libraries and archives of any importance in the Soviet Union are state-owned. Russian scientists and specialists in the

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United States, however, have free access to the libraries, records, and archives of our universities and other institutions.

The Soviets will not admit Americans whose applications for Exchange Program visits disclose real interest in advanced science or technology. To forestall wholesale Soviet rejections of American applicants from "endangering" the whole Cultural Exchange Program, our government exerts pressure and influence on American institutions to select only those American applicants who will be acceptable to the Soviets. The result is that 90% of the Soviets who come to the U.S. for scholarly research under the Cultural Exchange Program are specialists in the fields of mathematics, science, technology. Ninety percent of American scholars going to the Soviet Union work in the fields of history, linguistics, literature, or the social sciences. The 10% of Americans who go to Russia as scientific scholars are not permitted to do genuine research in their fields.[1]

One American academic administrator, involved in selecting Americans to go to the Soviet Union as exchange scholars, says:

"When you come right down to it, we are acting as Soviet agents in our own country, because we are, consciously or unconsciously, applying Soviet selection standards instead of our own to American applicants."[1]

An American director of the Cultural Exchange Program says:

"In effect, we have surrendered the control and direction of American exchange students in the Soviet Union to the Soviets."[1]

From the moment an American enters the Soviet Union — whether as a tourist or as an official member of a Cultural Exchange delegation — he is guided, controlled, and spied on. Hotel rooms where Americans stay are under constant surveillance by the secret police who use infrared photographic equipment, hidden closed-circuit TV cameras, concealed microphones, peepholes, and police agents in the person of guides and hotel personnel.[1]

Many Americans have been trapped into sexual affairs or given knock-out drops and manipulated into a condition of sodden drunkenness. When confronted with photographic and recorded evidence of their escapades, they are easily blackmailed into serving as Kremlin agents. They are given missions to spy on other members of their own American group; to spy on suspected Soviet personnel; to become, upon return to the United States, undercover agents for the purpose of reporting the activities of Russians attached to the UN and to the Soviet Embassy in Washington.

The KGB (Soviet Commission for State Security) has tried to recruit agents from every American delegation that has ever gone to the Soviet Union under the Cultural Exchange Program. Those who cannot be persuaded or blackmailed into serving the Kremlin suffer indignities, hardships, harassment.

Yet, Americans who have such experiences in the Soviet Union are strongly admonished by our government to say or write nothing publicly which "might endanger the Exchange Program."[1]

One wonders why some Americans do not speak out anyway. Self-interest is the answer. Those who have been blackmailed in the Soviet Union remain silent for obvious reasons. Others are specialists in the study of the Russian language, art, literature. Their careers are, in large part, dependent on their ability to make at least occasional trips to the Soviet Union. Any who say or publish anything the Soviets do not like will never be permitted to return.[1]

American press and broadcasting representatives in the Soviet Union are similarly blackmailed into serving as virtual propagandists for the Soviets. Competition between American news services is keen. A news service or network that can originate stories in the Soviet Union has a competitive advantage over those which cannot. A publication or news service that reports anything the Soviets do not like will never again get a correspondent inside the Soviet Union. Hence, American broadcasts and news stories originating inside the Soviet Union are little more than amplifications of the Kremlin's official propaganda

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line. On the other hand, Soviet correspondents in the United States have absolute freedom of press.

Note these specifics about our Cultural Exchange Program with the Soviets, quoted from *The Reporter*, an ultra-liberal magazine:

"In the course of 1964, at least three exchange participants were held for varying periods by the Soviets on charges connected directly or indirectly with espionage. The first was the target of a recruitment attempt by the Commission for State Security (KGB). The American was approached for a clandestine purpose by a Soviet acquaintance who was working for the KGB. The approach was then used as leverage by the KGB in an attempt to recruit the participant. The second case involved an exchange participant who was jailed in Warsaw after being victimized by the KGB operating in Poland. The third, an American implicated in a homosexual episode staged by the KGB, was bound over and threatened with photographic evidence of an offense that carries an eight-year maximum penalty."(1)

The United States has never accused any Soviet Exchange Program participant of espionage in this country, although it is generally known that members of Exchange delegations from Soviet-bloc nations are agents of the KGB or the GRU (Soviet Military Intelligence).

Important details on this situation were revealed by Oleg Penkovskiy, a colonel in Soviet Military Intelligence. After years of service in the GRU, Penkovskiy came to hate his Soviet masters, and began giving intelligence information to the West. He was arrested in the Soviet Union on October 22, 1962, tried, and sentenced to a long prison term. A diary, or collection of hastily written notes, which Penkovskiy kept from early 1961 to the time of his arrest, was smuggled out of the country. The notes were translated, edited, and published (by Doubleday & Company, New York, in 1965) as a book entitled *The Penkovskiy Papers.*

Here are pertinent excerpts:

"For the past few years the GRU has been engaged in training Soviet Army officers and civilians to be sent to other countries as Illegal *residents* or principal agents outside the U.S.S.R. These Illegals leave the country under deep cover, equipped with thoroughly prepared documentation that is beyond any suspicion . . . .

"Illegals in the U.S. are of the greatest significance . . . .

"Denis Polyakov, who works with me in the Committee, was sent to the U.S. in 1960 with a delegation. His primary task . . . was to collect the addresses of some of the buildings in Washington and New York that have been torn down, so that we might use these addresses in the future for Illegals . . . .

"As a rule, Illegals are given the task of joining some club, perhaps even two clubs; money for their activities is deposited in some particular bank . . . .

"When a Soviet ship sails to a foreign country, there are always three or four intelligence employees among its crew — sometimes a whole group. They carry with them radios and other technical equipment to establish communications with the agents in that country . . . .

"In a Soviet consulate, almost 100 per cent of the personnel are KGB, with one or two GRU officers included . . . .

"The GRU and KGB have people in every Soviet representation abroad: the UN, the trade missions, TASS, Aeroflot, Merchant Marine, newspaper correspondents, etc. . . . Because of the shortage of scientific personnel in the GRU, we co-opt our scientists who work with us, and these scientists carry out intelligence assignments in accordance with our instructions. . . .

"In Pakistan there are more agents intended for subversion and sabotage, because it is not considered so friendly a country as India. While I was working on the Pakistani Desk, even then the plans for sabotage activities and their objectives in Pakistan were completed. They included damaging the sources of water supplies, dams, poisoning of drinking water, and so forth, in order to spread panic among the population. At the same time there already exists printed propaganda material and material misinforming the population that all these acts of sabotage were perpetrated by Indians and Americans . . . .

"The 5th GRU Directorate, which engages in diversion and terroristic activity, has plans not only for immediate crisis points like Berlin. It has

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complete plans on what buildings should be blown up, who must be assassinated, what must be destroyed in New York, Washington, London, etc. Of course, this is not to be done now, but if and when it becomes necessary, the signals will be given . . . .

"Plans have already been made about broadcasts which will go on the air; the leaflets and other types of propaganda materials have already been printed for use in disorientating the populations in the areas where a war or an incident might take place . . . .

"The large cities in the U.S.A. offer favorable conditions to organize agent communications and to establish a cover story for them . . . .

"After a visiting Soviet delegation has been formed and each of its members has been given permission to go abroad by the Central Committee CPSU, we select certain scientists, engineers, or any other suitable members of the delegation, summon them to the GRU, and instruct them individually on the type of information we need and what they should direct their attention to while abroad . . . .

"Our main task as GRU intelligence officers in the Committee is recruitment of agents among the foreigners visiting the U.S.S.R. . . . We also collect information through personal contacts and conversations, by eavesdropping, by stealing secrets from the visitors' pockets, examining baggage, etc. . . .

"The reception of each foreign delegation in Moscow requires very careful preparations on our part. We prepare quarterly, monthly, and daily plans in which our experts describe in minute detail how the members of the delegation should be treated and cultivated. . . .

"All members of Soviet delegations traveling abroad are carefully instructed as to what types of conversations they should engage in and how to answer various questions. I can say in all honesty that there is nothing new that the Western scientists and specialists could learn from the Soviet specialists; neither will they get any valuable information when visiting Soviet exhibitions abroad. . . .

"When visiting the U.S., Canada, or any European country, we travel freely around these countries, see everything we wish to see, and steal all the secrets needed by us. But when foreign delegations visit the U.S.S.R., they encounter all sorts of restrictions and are sent only to those places where we want them to go. What do we let them see? Only that which is of no value. . . ."[2]

Nothing in the Constitution authorizes the federal government to engage in such activities as the Cultural Exchange Program. Congress should stop the program by repealing all statutes on which it is based (the Fulbright Act of 1946, the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948, the Fulbright-Hays Act of 1961), and by refusing to permit expenditure of any more tax money on it.

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FOOTNOTES

(1) "Cultural Exchange As the Soviets Use It," by George Bailey, *The Reporter*, April 7, 1966, pp. 20-25

(2) *The Penkovskiy Papers*, by Oleg Penkovskiy, Doubleday & Company, Inc., Garden City, New York, 1965, 397 pp.

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